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Ohio's Workmen's Compensation Law
Thomas P. Mclntyre*
T HE IDEA OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION originated in Germany
in 1884, and was designed as a crutch rather than a punitive
action. It was financial aid to the injured workman coupled to-
gether with adequate medical aid.
In the State of Ohio prior to the Workmen's Compensation
Law, the employee could seek relief by suing his employer in
Common Pleas Court. This type of action generally proved too
expensive for the employee. It was also noted that the employers
could not pay for an injury that was very costly because they
had no reserve set up for the situation.
In such cases before the courts, the employee had to prove
negligence on the part of the employer. The defendant employer
could then set up the defenses of contributory negligence, the
fellow servant rule and assumption of risk.
In 1911, workmen's compensation originated in Ohio and it
was called the "Employer's Liability Act" 1 with the employers
contributing 90% and the employees contributing 10%. The pur-
pose of the act was to provide compensation for loss resulting
from disability or death of a workman from industrial accidents
or disease without regard to negligence and fault. In 1912, by
constitutional amendment, authority was given to the legislature
to pass laws providing for a State Fund to be created by com-
pulsory contributions by employers only. In 1913, legislation
made the law compulsory and created the Industrial Commis-
sion, thereby eliminating the Board of Awards. In 1924, the right
of an employee to sue at law was taken away and the addition
of the right to an additional award was given for a violation of
a specific safety requirement.2 Later the definition of injury3
was set up to include any injury received in the course and aris-
ing out of the injured employee's employment.4 In 1955, the
* B.A., Duquesne University; Workmen's Compensation Representative,
Industrial Relations Dept., Ford Motor Co., Berea, Ohio.
1 Passed on May 31, 1911.
2 Ohio Rev. Code § 4121.131 gives the Industrial Commission power to de-
termine such claims under Section 35 of Article II of the Ohio Constitution.
See also Rules of Procedure, p. 50, dated 9-15-48.
3 Passed on Feb. 26, 1913, and effective Sept. 1, 1913.
4 Passed by the General Assembly on July 10, 1937, and further amended
in 1959, and effective Nov. 2, 1959 (§ 4123.01rc).
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Bureau of Workmen's Compensation originated as part of the In-
dustrial Commission. Its purpose is to adjudicate all new claims
and it is charged with the general business management of the
administrative agencies. The Industrial Commission remained
charged with the duty of final decision in matters of disputed
claims and also of passing upon all applications of permanent dis-
ability and all applications for settlement of claims. It also has
the final authority to fix rates, determine classifications and
manage the Fund.
The first test of this act occurred in 19125 when the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the act as long as the contributions
were on a voluntary basis.
Financial Aspects
There are two ways of administering Workmen's Compen-
sation in Ohio. One is by the State Fund System, wherein em-
ployers pay rated premiums based upon the risk involved in
their industry directly to the State Fund. These premiums are
paid in advance and each employer is required to report his pay-
roll every six months in order to determine his premium. In
establishing an employer's rate, each industry is classified ac-
cording to the hazard it represents. There are 241 classifications
of hazards and each is given a manual number.6 A merit rating
system is used to promote safety practices which gives an em-
ployer a credit against the basic rate for his classification. In
order to participate in a merit award, an employer must pay at
least $2000.00 of premium within a five year experienced period.
The second method of administering is by self-insurance. At
present, there are 214 self-insurers in Ohio. These employers
are required to place a bond with the Industrial Commission of
Ohio to insure that they will make payment of all their adjudi-
cated compensation claims. No less than a $25,000.00 bond nor
more than a $500,000.00 is required. A new bond is required
each year. In starting out as a self-insurer, an employer is gen-
erally required to place a bond equal to eight months premium.
Administrative costs are furnished by an assessment to the
companies in addition to their regular rate and by general rev-
enue. Employers are charged four cents per one hundred dol-
5 State ex rel. v. Creamer, 85 0. S. 349 (1912).
6 See Premium Rules and Rates, No. 49, effective July 1, 1961, issued by




lars of their payroll and this represents two-thirds of the ad-
ministrative premium. The remaining one-third is obtained from
general revenue. The administrative budget for the year gen-
erally runs around $10,500,000. This figure represents a 5% ratio
to the Fund and it is considered the lowest in the United States.
In Ohio, there is presently a $413,000,000.00 fund set up to handle
a total of 6,000,000 active claims.
Under the Disabled Worker's Relief Fund7 which is not
Workmen's Compensation, a claimant who is on Permanent Total
disability and is receiving less than $40.25 weekly benefits, may
obtain sufficient money from this fund up to $40.25. There are
about 5200 claimants participating in this fund at the present
time. Money for this fund was originally obtained through gen-
eral revenue but now it is arrived at by general revenue and an
excise tax of 3¢ for every $100.00 of each company's payroll.
The Surplus Funds is set up to provide disbursement of funds
under the handicap provisions2 to claimants as the Commission
determines. The Fund is provided for by setting aside ten per
cent of the money paid into the State Fund until a surplus of
$100,000.00 is obtained.
Rates of Compensation
Compensation is paid every two weeks at a rate of two-thirds
of the average weekly wage of the injured or deceased workman
for the year prior to injury or death. The maximum rate at the
date of such incident is determined by the following amounts:
Prior to Aug. 25, 1921 -------- $12.00
Prior to Jan. 1, 1924 ------------ 15.00
Prior to Sept. 4, 1941 ---------- 18.75
Prior to Sept. 12, 1947 -------- 21.00
Prior to Sept. 1, 1949 --------- 25.00
Prior to Sept. 18, 1951 ---------- 30.00
Prior to Oct. 5, 1955 ----------- 32.20
Prior to Nov. 2, 1959 ----------- 40.25
The current rate, effective November 2, 1959, is $49.00 per
week.
7 Established Oct. 21, 1953, and amended effective Nov. 2, 1959.
8 § 4123.34(B).
9 § 4123.343 as amended November 2, 1959.
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Injury
The Supreme Court has defined an "injury" in the line of
insurance being carried for accidents and not health insurance.
It has been proven often that a claimant described a disability
rather than an injury.
Of significance are the cases decided by the courts since the
Amendments to the Act in 1937. In Malone v. Industrial Com-
mission0 the plaintiff's husband died of heat exhaustion in the
course of performing his regular duties under intense heat. The
Court held that an injury had to be accidental in character and
result and held that this was a compensatory situation. This case
loosened up the law of injury by maintaining that any disability
suddenly and unexpectedly occurring at work was compensable.
In Reynolds v. Industrial Commission," the claimant had
been working in a cramped position for about three months and
developed back trouble. The Supreme Court, after referring to
the definition of a compensable injury outline in the above case,
stated that nothing had occurred to the claimant within the
purview of such definition which would constitute an accidental
injury.
In Matczak v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,1 2 the claim-
ant suffered a back disability while lifting bags fourteen inches
higher than he customarily lifted them. Here the Court held
that he was not entitled to benefits as he had not sustained an
accidental injury. (Note this case was decided before the Malone
case).
In Artis v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,1" the claimant,
because of a shortage of help was forced to stack liners upon
skids to a height of seven feet, whereas he normally stacked them
only to a height of five feet. While doing so he developed a
sudden pain in his back. The Court held that there was no evi-
dence of any sudden mishap or happening causing injury to him.
Also, that the only unusual thing about his work was lifting liners
a greater distance and this did not constitute such a claim upon
which workmen's compensation could be based.
10 140 0. S. 292 (1942).
11 145 0. S. 389 (1945).
12 139 0. S. 181 (1942).




In 1956, the now famous Dripps case, 14 was decided and the
Court in its opinion stated as follows:
Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act, comprehends a physical
or traumatic damage or harm accidental in character and as
the result of external and accidental means in the sense
of being the result of a sudden mishap, occurring by chance,
unexpectedly and not in the usual course of events, at a
particular time and place.
This case had given a clearer explanation of the requirement
that an injury had to be accidental and that it had to be the re-
sult of an accidental cause or means and it was not sufficient that
the result be unexpected or accidental.
However, effective in 1959,15 the definition was redefined as
follows:
"Injury" includes any injury whether caused by external ac-
cidental means or accidental in character and result, received
in the course of and arising out of, the injured employe's
employment.
It would appear that there is a close relationship between this
definition and the Malone case which is pre-Dripps case.
The Deputy Administrator has written an opinion in Harris-
Seybold v. Hamm,'G in which he interprets the new definition
of an injury by setting up the following guide in order to de-
termine whether an injury is compensable:
1. There must be a showing that the injury was sustained
in the course of and arising out of employment.
2. There must be something accidental in character and re-
sult.
Pertinent Portions of the Act
Temporary Total Disability.17 An employee having been
found to be entitled to temporary total disability benefits, because
of injury at work will be entitled to receive sixty-six and two-
thirds per cent of his average weekly wage up to $49.00 as long
as the disability remains total. In no case shall such benefits
exceed ten thousand, seven hundred and fifty dollars. The min-
imum rate is $25.00 per week.
14 165 0. S. 407 (1946).
15 § 4123.01(C).
16 Reported in the Merriman Sutherly Journal #36, dated 8-22-60.
17 § 4123.56.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1962
11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
Permanent Partial Disability.18 An employee entitled to an
award of permanent partial disability may elect to accept such
award under an impairment of physical disability, the impair-
ment or earning capacity and the vocational handicap. No such
award can be made before forty weeks after the injury or his
return to work following his first period of Temporary Total dis-
ability. However, an employee entitled to an award because of
amputation, ankylosis, loss of eye, loss of hearing (total loss)
or facial disfigurement does not have such election, but he must
accept under a schedule of loss set up by law. Under this sec-
tion no waiting period is necessary. The maximum amount pay-
able is nine thousand, eight hundred dollars.
Temporary Partial Disability.'9 An employee having been
found to be able to return to work but who suffers an impair-
ment in his earning capacity by reason of his injury may receive
benefits. This is paid at the rate of two-thirds of his actual im-
pairment. Any payments as such may be offset whenever the
employee receives his permanent award if any. The maximum
amount payable is ten thousand dollars.
Permanent Total Disability.20 After an employee has been
found to be permanently and totally disabled he will receive a
weekly benefit until his death. The loss of both hands, both
arms, both feet, both legs or both eyes or any two thereof consti-
tutes permanent and total disability.
Death.21 If death occurs within two years following the in-
jury or if the disability has been continuous between injury and
death, the dependents of the decedent are entitled benefits. The
maximum benefit payable is eighteen thousand, five hundred
dollars.
Medical.22 An employee who is injured in the course of his
employment has a right to choose any licensed physician, 23 he
may desire. He may not change physicians without the consent
of the Commission. Such fees as are charged are governed by






23 This includes medical doctors, dentists, chiropractors, osteopaths and
mechanotherapists, or any licensed doctor in the State of Ohio.





If a case becomes controverted by reason of the employer
denying any or all of the allegations set out by the employee-
claimant, a hearing is held before a deputy administrator who is
located nearest to the claimant's home address. There are six-
teen such locations. The hearing officer is not bound by common
law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal
rules of procedure. 25
Following this hearing either of the parties may file an ap-
plication for reconsideration to the Administrator within ten
days after receipt of the final order of the deputy administrator's
decision or file a notice of appeal to the local regional board.
There are five such boards located in Ohio. From a decision of
the Administrator, either party may appeal to the regional board
within twenty days of receipt of the final order of the administra-
tor. From the regional board, either party may file an appeal
to the Industrial Commission who may or may not grant a hear-
ing. From here, either party may file a Notice of Appeal to the
Common Pleas Court along with his Petition in Appeal. The
claimant may, however, fie his appeal directly to the Common
Pleas Court from a decision of the Regional Board. In practice,
the claimant generally exhausts all of his appeal rights with the
Industrial Commission before going to court.
In order to properly be heard on appeal, an Application for
Reconsideration must be fied within ten days from receipt of a
final order. To file a Notice of Appeal, it must be fied within
twenty days from receipt of a final order, or sixty days if the
appeal is to Common Pleas Court.
No appeal is permitted from a hearing before the Referee of
the Industrial Commission on the question of percentage of
permanent partial disability, however, the full Commission may
grant a rehearing before them on an Application for Reconsidera-
tion. All of the hearings are de novo.
Borderline Cases
Many cases arise which carry the color of gray. These have
come to be known as borderline cases or cases in the gray area.
It has been difficult to establish the compensability in each case.
Listed here are some of the leading cases in Ohio which have
helped to establish the law in this area:
25 § 4123.515.
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Ott v. Industrial Commission.26 The Court of Appeals set out
that both the employee and the employer received consideration
for a benefit from this recreation activity which was the direct
outgrowth of a program which was not only authorized by the
corporation but definitely sponsored by it because the equip-
ment was furnished by it. The decedent suffered a heart attack
when he sat down on the bench after being tagged out while
running the bases during a softball game.
It was held that there was sufficient relationship at the time
of his death to his employment to justify the conclusion that the
claimant was entitled to compensation. There is a general feel-
ing if such a case were presented to the Supreme Court, the
employer would prevail. The Court in this case noted the In-
dustrial Commission rule2 7 pertaining to athletics that it was
sufficient to make this case compensable and that they (Indus-
trial Commission) had not exceeded their rule making power in
promulgating this rule.
Scores of compensable accidental injuries result where no
accidental circumstances precedes or causes them. Many such
injuries have been recognized as compensable by the Supreme
Court of Ohio, 28 while in many other cases regarding injuries to
employees outside of the employer's premises have been held
not compensable 29 even though an actual injury had occurred.
With regard to parking lot cases, Walburn v. General Fire-
proofing Co.,30 held that where the hazard was no greater than it
26 830 0. App. 13 (1948).
27 Item #4 Important Resolutions, Rules, Order and Instructions issued by
the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, revised April 1, 1956:
It is hereby directed that in all cases where the employer encourages
the employes to engage in athletics, either during working hours or
outside of working hours, and supervises or directs, either directly or
indirectly, such activities, meritorious claims for injuries to any such
employes while so engaged will be recognized, the employer's risk and
experience to be charged with such cases. In the event any such em-
ployes, while so engaged, receive extra compensation from the em-
ployer, the same shall be included in the payroll reports of this de-
partment.
This order shall not apply to employers who do not supervise and
direct either directly or indirectly athletic activities of their employes
or do not pay the employes for the time devoted to athletics.
28 See 43 N. E. 2d at 270 (Malone Case).
29 See 107 0. S. 387 (1923), 123 0. S. 604 (1931), 127 0. S. 345 (1933), 0. S.
129 (1934), 10 N. E. 2d 242 (1937), 145 0. S. 198 (1945).




was to the general public no liability will lie. This remains in
effect today.
In Pickett v. Industrial Commission,31 the plaintiff was in-
jured in the parking lot at work. The employer neither owned
or controlled the parking lot. The court held that an accident
occurring in the parking lot before the employee starts work or
after he finishes work was normally compensable.
In Fike v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,3 2 the plaintiff sued
at common law for injuries he sustained on a public sidewalk
along the employer's plant where he intended to go to work and
was struck by the employer's truck. The employer argued that
the employee should have participated in the state Workmen's
Compensation because he was within the zone of his employ-
ment and hence his rights were limited under the Act. The court,
however, affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff.
Horseplay and altercation have been defined in Davis v. In-
dustrial Commission" and in Industrial Commission v. Banks.
34
In the former case the plaintiff's decedent was involved in an
argument at work and a fight ensued which resulted in the plain-
tiff's death. The court said, "This work was voluntarily aban-
doned when he became engaged in the fight which it appears
was a private affair." The latter case involved horseplay in
which the court applied the same rule as above. Here the em-
ployee instigated and engaged in horseplay in which the em-
ployer did not acquiesce. The court here distinguished this case
from the Industrial Commission v. Weigandt,35 decision by say-
ing here the employee himself and not the environment actually
created the hazard. In the latter case the employee was struck
by a file which flew from the handle during a friendly scuffle for
it by two other employees. The accident was held to be com-
pensable because his employment had some casual connection
with the injury, either through its activities, conditions or en-
vironments.
31 129 N. E. 2d 639 (1954).
82 56 0. App. 197 (1937).
33 76 0. L. A. 474 (1957).
34 127 0. S. 517 (1934).
35 102 0. S. 1 (1921).
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Free Choice of Physicians
State fund companies remain unaffected by the recent
amendments3 6 to the law regarding free choice of physicians.
Formerly self-insurers had the right of treating an injured work-
man providing of course that such treatment was adequate. This
new provision 37 now permits an employee who is injured or dis-
abled in the course of his employment to have a free choice of
such licensed physician he may desire to have serve him.
There are two reported decisions with the Industrial Com-
mission, but none by the Supreme Court which have dealt with
the problem of this free choice when the employee and employer
have disagreed. These cases have dealt primarily with rules of
procedure effective with the new amendments.38
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Terrell,39 claimant
sustained a knee injury. The employer admitted the injury and
was ordered to pay the fee of claimant's physician. It was the
employer's position that a change of physicians was not au-
thorized. The employer had rendered treatment on six occasions.
The claimant was not satisfied with his progress and went to his
own doctor without requesting permission from his employer.
The administrator found that the claimant in the exercise of his
free choice of physician had selected the self-insuring employer
and ordered him to pay his own bills.
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Kovach,40 the claimant
sustained a knee injury. The employer admitted the injury and
was ordered to pay the fee of claimant's physician. The em-
ployer claimed that a change of physicians was not authorized.
Claimant was treated by the company doctor on four occasions.
Following this, claimant's wife called and requested permission
to change doctors. Permission was denied by the employer on
the grounds that the employee had made his choice and selection
of physician. The claimant went to his own doctor, but the em-
ployer did not make a specific notice in writing to the Bureau
setting forth the disagreement. The administrator found that the
36 Amendments effective Nov. 2, 1959.
37 § 4123.651.
38 See Rule 7. Rules of Procedure in Claims against Self-Insuring Em-
ployers. Bureau of Workmen's Compensation. The Industrial Commission
of Ohio. Effective Nov. 2, 1959.
39 Reported in Merriman & Sutherly Reports, Vol. 36, p. 322, No. 41, 12-26-60.





claimant did make his selection to be treated by the company
doctor and did notify the employer as required. Since the serv-
ices rendered were necessary and proper and the employer did
not comply properly with published procedure, he ordered the
employer to pay the medical fee services.
Conclusion
Presenting a comprehensive study of Ohio Workmen's Com-
pensation would require far more space than is presented here.
Anyone who employs three or more workers must carry Work-
men's Compensation Insurance. No private insurance may be
substituted for Workmen's Compensation, because Ohio's Work-
men's Compensation is a monopoly. The law in this field through-
out the United States is ever changing. In almost all of the forty-
six states whose legislatures met in regular session last year,
Workmen's Compensation legislation has been enacted, excluding
Ohio. The percentage of benefit increases range from less than
10% to approximately 23%. Ohio's benefits rank with the higher
benefit states.
In conclusion, Ohio Workmen's Compensation stands for the
following often quoted saying, despite the many abuses of the
law:
WE PAY FOR THE TEAR BUT NOT THE WEAR.
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